Abstract. Nash's classical bargaining solution suggests that N players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the players are chosen from a continuum distribution µ and suppose they are to divide up a resource ν that is also on a continuum. The utility to each player is determined by the exponential of a distance type function. The maximization problem becomes an optimal transport type problem, where the target density is the minimizer to the functional
Introduction
In the 1950's [10] John Nash characterized a solution to the bargaining problem that has since been central to the theory. Namely, the Nash bargaining solution is the allocation that maximizes the product of the utilities to each player, over the total space of possible allocations of a surplus. The Nash bargaining solution is not only mathematically natural but can be achieved by strategic approaches, see [2] . For more on the economic theory, see [9] .
In this paper, we consider utility functions that are given as an integral of a utility density function, namely
Here Y is a surplus space, X is a player space, ν i is a measure on the space Y that determines the allocation of resources to player p i ∈ X, and
is a utility density function. More details are found in section 2. We begin by extending an observation of Schumacher [11] to continua. For utility of the form s(x, y) = e −c(x,y)
for a cost function c, Nash bargaining solutions will be optimal transport plans between a measure µ which is known a priori, and some measure β which is determined by the solution. Thus, for the purpose of maximizing the product of The author's work was supported in part by the NSF via DMS-1161498. 1 the utility functions U i , we need only to parameterize a space of measures on the resource space, or equivalently, a set of Kantorivich potentials. This allows us to do analysis in the spirit of Benamou-Carlier-Mérigot-Oudat [1] , in order to show that discrete solutions have continuous limits. We consider the particular case when the spaces X, Y ⊂ R n are both convex compact domains, players are distributed according to a probability measure µ, and surplus is distributed according to a measure ν, both of which are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and the utility density is given by s(x, y) = e −|x−y| 2 /2 .
Following the arguments in [1] , we find that the limit of solutions can be described by a gradient mapping, whose potential satisfies a fourth order PDE. The problem becomes equivalent to minimizing
which gives a fourth order nonlinear PDE similar to Abreu's equation [5] . In particular, the quantity det D 2 ϕ(x) satisfies a second order elliptic equation. In Section 4 we show that det D 2 ϕ(x) is bounded and Hölder continuous; from here we can apply Caffarelli's Schauder theory for Monge-Ampère equations. Smoothness will follow by the general Schauder theory, see Section 5. The statements about the boundedness and Hölder continuity should hold more generally, for minimizers of functionals of the form (3) min
where f satisfies some convexity and other conditions. Our main result (stated roughly for now) is as follows Theorem 1.1. Under appropriate conditions on the measures µ, ν and for c(x, y) = |x − y| 2 /2, solutions to finite player Nash bargaining solutions converge to a continuum Nash bargaining solution.
We also have a regularity result:
Suppose that X, Y ⊂ R n are smooth, bounded, convex domains. Suppose that µ and ν and smooth measure densities on X and Y respectively, that are bounded and bounded away from zero. Then, the minimizers of the functional (2) are smooth.
Regularity for the Jordan-Kinderlehrer-Otto Scheme on the torus was shown in [8] . The proof of regularity in [8] for functionals of the form (2) is for small time scales (which is sufficient to prove regularity of the JKO scheme) and assumes some differentiability. An L ∞ estimate on the densities obtained via the JKO scheme for a general form of a parabolic-elliptic Keller-Segel type system, was shown recently in [4] . We are able to obtain Hölder estimates directly on the minimizing measures without any assumptions of differentiability or smallness. Abreu's equation involves minimizing a functional of the form (2) , where the gradient term is replaced by a integral involving the potential ϕ. Details on regularity for Abreu's equation can be found in [7] .
Setup
Our goal in this section is to describe the bargaining problem in terms of measures.
Suppose that Y is any topological space, and ν is a Borel probability measure on Y. We call the pair (Y, ν) the surplus. When there are N players vying for portions of the surplus, we can think of the space of possible allocations of the surplus as N -tuples of non-negative Borel measures (ν 1 , ..., ν N ), such that
is called a utility density function. The value s(x, y) gives the utility to player at x ∈ X for a unit of y ∈ Y. As we will be integrating the density, it makes most sense to assume the utility is linear in terms of a fixed resource y, in the sense that the marginal utility to a player at x of a unit y is determined only by the utility density function, and not by a function of the same or other player's allocations.
Example 2.1. Suppose two emporers have set up capital cities at points x 1 and x 2 in a region Ω ⊂ R 2 , and must negotiate how to split the region. Each emporer decides that the value of any unit y of land to their kingdom is given by e −|xi−y| 2 /2 . The possible allocations of the region are measures ν 1 , ν 2 such that
The utility function to each is
Notice that in the N -player case, when the utility density is positive, paretooptimal solutions are a set of N measures with
e. the right marginal) we may consider the measures ν i = π |{pi}×Y . In this case, we can define the utility to each player as follows
The Nash bargaining solution is determined by maximizing the Nash product, namely
(Note that we are assuming the disagreement point is the 0-allocation, that is, all players gets nothing when they do not agree.) Equivalently, one can maximize the logarithm
With this in mind, for the case of N players, we define the Nash bargaining problem as follows: Problem 2.2. Find a measure π that maximizes the functional
over the space of measures π ∈ P (X × Y ), under the constraint
The term ln N and factor 1/N do not affect the arg max, however, they are present for normalization reasons which will become clear when we attempt to build a continuous solution.
2.1.
Reformulating the functional. Working with (5):
At this point, we define a measure on X = {p 1 , ..., p N } as
we get
Note that if α(p i ) = 0, then ln dα dµ dµ = −∞, in which case A(p i ) may be undefined, but we agree that F (π) = −∞. Recall that a measure π ∈ P (X × Y ), is a solution to the optimal transportation problem pairing the measures µ and ν, when π minimizes c(x, y)dπ = max
where ϕ c is the "cost-transform" of ϕ. This is a general fact. For many cost functions of interest (for example c(x, y) = |x − y| 2 /2) the functions ϕ c and ϕ are determined uniquely up to a constant. Proposition 2.3. The measure π is an optimal plan, pairing α and ν.
Proof. We proceed as in [12, proof of Theorem 5.10, step 3 on page 65]. We will show that π is c-cyclically monotone.
Suppose that
We would like to show that
(using convention that y 0 = y N ). Moving a bit of mass from (x 1 , y 1 ) to (x 2 , y 1 ) will preserve the right marginal condition, but cannot increase the functional, by maximality. Because (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ Supp(π), there is some mass available to move. Choose an arbitrarily small set B ε near (x 1 , y 1 ) in y and consider the competing family of measures for t ∈ [0, 1] :
Clearly π(t) is a path of admissible measures, so we can take a one-sided derivative of (5) with respect to t :
That is
Choosing B ε small, since s is continuous, the average values in the numerator must converge to point values, and in the limit we see
Then we have
By relabeling,
Summing, we have
and X, Y ⊂ R n . Then the solution maximizing (5) can be described as
where each E i is a Laguerre cell, defined as the subgradient of a convex function ϕ at point x i .
We won't prove this directly, but refer the reader to [12, Chapter 5] and [1, Section 2]. We include a condensed recap of [1, Section 2] which will help our discussion moving forward:
Suppose P ⊂ R n is a finite set of points, and
is the set of functions which are Legendre-Fenchel transforms of functions on Y, which are necessarily convex. Define
For normalization, we define 
Reformulating the problem again. Now that we have established that the solution must be an optimal transport plan, we may formulate the problem over the space of optimal transport plans. First, we need Lemma 2.6. A maximizing solution to (5) exists, and is unique.
Proof. The constraint π Y = ν is linear on the set of nonnegative probability measures, which form a compact convex set. For each i, the functional
is clearly linear in the measure π. It follows that the sum of logarithms is strictly concave. A concave function on a convex compact set achieves its maximum value, which is unique by strict concavity.
It is clear that the maximizing measure must be supported on P × Y : Moving any mass from a point not in P to a point on P will increase the value of F. By Kantorovich duality, the optimal transport plans with target ν can be parameterized by convex functions on the set P, which is just a set of N values. The functional can be expressed as follows.
where
. We now offer a second formulation of the problem. Problem 2.7. (Nash bargaining problem, Version 2) Maximize (9) over the space of functions K Y (P ) 0 .
2.4.
Absolutely continuous pushforward measures. Given a potential function ϕ ∈ K Y (P ) 0 , we have a Laguerre decomposition of Y. The subgradient map is set-valued, so one cannot define the pushforward directly. However, following [1] , if we have chosen a background measure ν, we can "average" over the Laguerre cell to define an absolutely continuous pushforward measure.
Given any decomposition of Y into cells E i , each with positive measure, define the following probability measure on Y : For measurable Z ⊂ Y,
In the measure π, which is optimal between α and ν, each cell {p i }×E i has measure ν(E i ). By multiplying each piece by 1
we get a new measure, π ′ , which has the same support as π, but now has marginals
This means that the set-valued mapping induced by the subgradient of ϕ is an optimal transport mapping not only between α and ν , but also between µ N and β ϕ .
Limits of finite source solutions
Our next goal is to take a limit of solutions, when the set of points is drawn from a distribution µ and the number of points becomes infinite. In the following we assume that X, Y ⊂ R n are both bounded convex regions, and that µ, ν are probability measures on X, Y respectively, each of which are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, with densities bounded away from zero. For each N, choose a set of points P N from X and define the measure
In the sequel we will assume that µ N → µ weakly on X. By arguments in the previous section, for each N we have
each of which are unique and can be used to identify the solution. We will see that when µ, ν are nice measures, all four of the objects (11) converge to limiting objects, respectively, each of which uniquely defines a solution on the continuous space X × Y.
Inspecting (7), note the following. The first term is the relative entropy of a known measure µ with respect to a measure α, to be determined. The second term is the integral of the natural log of the average of an exponential function, over a small cell. As the size of the cells becomes smaller, one expects the average to recover the value, and the second term will become the negative total cost of the mass transport plan between µ and its image β under the mapping, which is also to be determined. Under changes of measures µ → β α → ν the first term becomes the negative relative entropy of β with respect to the measure ν. Thus we may formulate the problem by trying to minimize the following function over the set of probability measures on Y .
The concave functionalF will have a unique maximizer on P (Y ). Definê β = arg maxF (·) and chooseφ such thatβ = (∇φ) # µ.
Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let π N be a sequence of maximizers to (5), and let β N be the associated absolutely continuous right marginals (10), Then
In particular, becauseF is strictly concave,
In this case, chooseφ such thatβ
We defineφ as the potential solution, ∇φ as the map solution, and the measure π = (I × ∇φ) # µ ∈ P (X × Y ) as the measure solution of the Nash bargaining problem.
3.1. Outline of Proof. We outline four steps, and then combine these in step 5 to get the proof. The detailed proof of steps 1-4 will appear in section 4. Note that this result almost follows from [1, Theorem 4.1]. Instead of a pure Wasserstein term, however, in our problem we have a term that should converge to a Wasserstein term, provided the measures concentrate on the graph of a map. So we must justify that indeed the maximimizers of our finite problem are indeed concentrating on the graph of map. We reproduce some, but not all of the proof.
Step 1. The functionalF has maximizer,β. The density dβ dν is bounded and Hölder continuous.
Step 2. There is a sequence of optimal transportation plans pairing µ N withβ. To these we can associate a functionφ N and an absolutely continuous measureβ N. Thenβ N →β andF (β N ) → F (β). The associated Laguerre cells have diameters which go uniformly to 0.
Step 3. For the maximizers ϕ N of the finite problem, we can also associate an absolutely continuous measure β N (23). The limits of both exist, and the diameters of the associated Laguerre cells go uniformly to 0.
Step 4. Because the diameters of the Laguerre cells go to zero, the second term in theF N functional (9) (defined on ϕ N orφ N ) converges to the second term in in theF functional (defined on the associated β N ). That is
It follows that
Step 5. Proof of Theorem. Choose ε > 0 : Because we have chosen ϕ N as a maximizer for (9) we have
Thus for N large depending on ε,
≥F β − 3ε, by step 2.
Thus,
ButF β is the maximum. By strict concavity, it follows that β N →β. Thus β =β.
Proof details
Unless otherwise specified, c will refer to an arbitrary cost function c : X × Y → R and W c will refer to the Wasserstein distance, given the cost c. The cost c is assumed to have global bounds and global Lipschitz bounds.
The results of Step 1 should hold for general cost c, whereas the results in Step 2 and 3 rely on Caffarelli's regularity theory for c = |x − y| 2 /2. Although we are most interested in the case g(u) = ln u, in Step 1 we consider a slight generalization to functionals of the form
4.1.
Step 1. First an easy observation.
Claim 4.1. Fixing µ, suppose that β 1 , β 2 are probability measures, and that there is an open set O such that β 1 (E) = β 2 (E) for all measurable E ⊂ O, and
Proof. Let π be an optimal pairing for µ, β 1 . We obtain a candidate transport plan for pairing µ with β 2 by shifting mass vertically along the set of size η so that the right marginal is β 2 . The cost of this plan can increase at most by c Lip diam(Y )η.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose thatβ is the minimizer of a functional of the form
where g is strictly increasing function,unbounded above, and
Then, the density dβ dν is bounded above, that iŝ
Note that in the case we are interested, g(u) = ln u.
Proof. First, by evaluating the functional F on the measure ν, we see
It follows that the minimum F (β) is also finite, in particular dβ dν cannot be infinite on a set of positive β measure, so dβ dν exists a.e. dβ and hence a.e. dν. We can decompose Y (a.e ν) into a countable union:
Choose an M large, and assume that δ =β(
Choose a subsetẼ ⊂ E 0 such that ν(Ẽ) = δ (Such a set exists by a Markov's inequality argument for any M > 1.) By Jensen's Inequality (the function ug(u) is convex)
Now we create a competing measure, by moving the mass from E M toẼ. That is,
This gives another probability measure β * . Now β * =β except on these two small sets, so we have
using Claim 4.1. Now using the minimizing property ofβ, we have
We conclude
In particular, for larger values of M, β(E m ) = 0.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose thatβ is as in the previous Lemma and in addition that
Then the density dβ dν is Hölder 1/2 continuous.
Proof. Choose any point y in the interior of Y. We claim that given δ > 0, there is an ι > 0 to be determined, such that for 
Choose small η > 0 and sets E − , E + such that ν(E − ) = ν(E + ) = η and
Then letβ
Consider the measure β * created by replacingβ with the average value ofβ on the sets E − and E + , namely
Now let f (u) = ug(u) and consider the quantity
Note that
Applying Jensen's inequality on the sets
Now recall ν(E±) = η, (18)
Multiplying η across (20), (21), and (22) and combining, we see.
Comparing with Claim 4.1, noting that the mass moved is bounded by 2M η, and using the maximality ofβ, we conclude that
Revisiting our original assumption (17) , we take
and obtain a contradiction. Immediately we conclude that dβ dν is C 0,1/2 .
4.2.
Step 2. This is essentially [1, Steps 4 and 5, section 4]. In short: by Brenier's Theorem, we may find φ N such that ∇φ Nβ = µ N . Because µ N → µ, the potentials φ N converge uniformly. It follows that the Legendre transformsφ N converge uniformly as well, toφ. If the diameter of the Laguerre cells does not shrink to zero, there will be a line segment on which the convex potentialφ is linear. This contradicts Caffarelli's regularity result [3] , which ensures that the potential defining the mapping between the absolutely continuous measures µ andβ must be strictly convex.
Each φ N defines a set of Laguerre cells {E i } . We can define a measure:
which has the property that ∇φ NβN = µ N .
The densities dβN dν will converge pointwise uniformly to dβ dν , because the density dβN dν (y) is simply the average of the continuous density of dβ dν over the cell containing y, and the cell diameters are shrinking to zero. It follows quickly thatF (β N ) → F β .
4.3.
Step 3. For each finite player Nash bargaining problem, we choose ϕ N maximizing (9) , and obtain a set of Laguerre cells {E i } . As before, we construct a probability measure on Y
We would like to conclude these β N → β, but we do not yet have a unique limit β. We need to use properties of β N to conclude properties of possible limits β. 
Proof. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2.3, we have
Bε
This will be true for any pair, so the ratios of the measures is uniformly bounded:
Claim 4.5. The measures α N have a weak limit α which is absolutely continuous with respect to µ. The density dα/dµ is bounded away from zero.
Proof. On the compact space X, the Wasserstein metric is compact, and equivalent to weak topology, so there is a weak limit α. A straightforward argument in the spirit of Littlewood's principles using (24) shows that for all measurable E,
Next we consider the convergence of ϕ N . In order to extend these to X, we denoteφ
Claim 4.6. The functionsφ N converge uniformly on compact subsets of X.
Proof. This follows from the fact that (K Y ) 0 is compact: The space of convex functions with subgradients in a bounded set is compact up to addition of a constant. c(x, y)dπ = max
which is realized by
Now the set of cost-transpose functions {ϕ c ; ϕ : X → R} is also compact up to addition of a constant. Thus the functions ϕ c N converge uniformly as well. Taking all limits and letting π be the weak limit of π N , we have
By duality, it follows that ϕ describes the optimal map between α and ν. In particular, for c = |x − y| 2 /2 we conclude that (∇ϕ) # α = ν. Now, we simply define
Despite knowing less about the regularity of β than we did forβ in Step 2, we may repeat the essential portion of the argument found in [1] . Caffarelli's strict convexity result [3] only requires the densities are bounded and bounded away from zero, which is true by Claim 4.4 for α and ν. We conclude that the potential ϕ is strictly convex and that the Laguerre cells associated to ϕ N must have vanishing diameters.
4.4.
Step 4. For either ϕ N orφ N , note that for each cell E i the following holds for p i and any y i ∈ E i :
The average value of the cost over any set must be larger than
It follows immediately by the fundamental theorem of calculus that
Now for any set of choices of
The utility function is continuous, so as the diameters of E i shrink, so does the right hand side of (26). On the other hand
The cost function is continuous, and the values y i are being chosen from the subgradient of ∇ϕ N (p i ), and µ N → µ, so we conclude
This proves the first claim in Step 4. Next, note that
Thus, using (27),(25), recalling (12) , and (9) 
This proves (14). A nearly identical argument proves (15).
A Fourth Order PDE and smoothness of solutions
In this section we argue that the function ϕ satisfies an elliptic quasilinear fourth order PDE and enjoys derivative estimates of all orders.
Given a smooth probability measure µ on X, one can parameterize the space of probability measures on Y by convex potentials ϕ on X : For any β, we can solve the optimal transportation problem pairing µ with β, obtaining ϕ such that (29) β = (∇ϕ) # µ.
On the other hand, for any convex ϕ the subgradient mapping defines a probability measure via (29). Using this, we can insert ϕ into the functionalF :
Now ∇ϕ is a change of measure, sô
Now consider a compactly supported variation:
for some compactly supported smooth test function η. We compute
∇ν(∇ϕ) + µ (x − ∇ϕ) ηdx.
Here ϕ ij is the inverse of the Hessian matrix ϕ ij . Now if the measure β = (∇ϕ) # µ is a maximizer, any compactly supported variation will not change the functional to first order, so we have an Euler-Lagrange equation:
∇ν(∇ϕ(x)) + µ (x − ∇ϕ) = 0.
This becomes an equation on det(D 2 ϕ(x)) : Write the first term as
where C ij ϕ = det D 2 ϕ(x)ϕ ij is the (divergence-free) cofactor matrix. We see
∇ν(∇ϕ(x)) − µ(x) (x − ∇ϕ(x)) . will be C 2,α , with estimates on any interior set [3] . In particular, the cofactor matrix defining L is uniformly elliptic. Thus the equation (30) is uniformly elliptic with Hölder coefficients. Also note that because ϕ ∈ C 2,α , the right hand side of (30) is C 0,α . Thus we can apply the classical Schauder theory [6, Theorem 6 .19] and conclude that det D 2 ϕ(x) is itself C 2,α . Repeating these two steps gives estimates of arbitrarily high order.
Now we determined in

